Op-Ed: Beyond the constitutional debate: unpacking the political conundrum

The Ethiopian constitution drove more interest, analysis and scrutiny in the past month than it had since its promulgation. Politicians and scholars have discussed and debated on what they referred as a constitutional conundrum after the National election board announced that it cannot conduct election as scheduled due to the COVID-19 pandemic.

Lack of clear provisions in the constitution to determine what happens if elections cannot be held for reasons such as a global pandemic is at the center of the conundrum. What is the legitimate constitutional way to extend the elections? Who will have the legitimate power to rule until the election is held? How long can the election get extended? Can regions decide to have their own elections?

Some have argued that these questions are fundamentally constitutional ones and must be resolved by constitutional mechanisms only. To the contrary some others have argued that this is primarily a political problem and solutions must be sought politically.

Constitutions are political documents and are supposed to devise systems and institutions to address issues, including political ones such as this one. When constitutions resolve political problems, it is rightfully called the rule of law which is a means and an end in any constitutional democratic system.  

However, Ethiopia’s current context requires a closer look at political issues, motives and positions that underpin the constitutional conundrum if it is to have any chance of success in sustaining the political order.  Many have written on the political issues and proposed solutions. At the risk of being redundant, or even stating the obvious, this article is an attempt to examine the political conundrum and analyze the possibility of success of the constitutional process. 

further read: https://addisstandard.com/op-ed-beyond-the-constitutional-debate-unpacking-the-political-conundrum/

Commentary: Can Abiy Ahmed Continue to Remodel Ethiopia? (expanded version) Addis Standard

Abel Abate Demissie & Ahmed Soliman

The prime minister has made great strides at reforming the authoritarian state in his first year. But how will he confront the hurdles ahead?

Addis Abeba, April 17/2019 – It has been a whirlwind year for Ethiopia since Abiy Ahmed became prime minister. He has initiated a raft of reforms to overhaul Ethiopia’s authoritarian government structure, significantly improved relations with neighbors and received widespread international acclaim, including a nomination for the Nobel Peace Prize. But the same period has seen a sharp increase in lawlessness, intensified domestic conflict, heightened identity-based violence and huge internal displacement.

The fervor of ‘Abiymania’ has waned in recent months, as the reality of the monumental tests that lie ahead hit home. Having created massive expectations among competing constituencies, there are growing fears that Abiy’s reforms might end up achieving neither good governance nor stability. To date his accomplishments far outweigh his shortcomings. But significant tests lie ahead.
For his government’s undoubted successes to be built on, the prime minister needs to re-double focus on the domestic agenda. This includes dealing with the growing unrest, revitalizing the ruling party under a common vision and detailing a strategy for institutionalizing political, judicial, security, economic and social reforms. This restructure will require well targeted and sequenced plans, along with his unifying philosophy of Medemer, especially given continued institutional capacity constraints.

Read more on Addis Standard

ጠ/ሚ አብይ አህመድ ኢትዮጵያን በለውጥ ሃዲድ ያስቀጥሉ ይሆን? Chatham House article

Abel Abate and Ahmed Soliman

ከጠቅላይ ሚኒስትር አብይ ወደ ስልጣን መምጣት ወዲህ ኢትዮጵያ በፈጣን የለውጥ ጎዳና ላይ ትገኛለች፡፡ ጠቅላይ ሚኒስትሩ መጠነ ሰፊ የማሻሻያ እርምጃዎችን በመውሰድ አምባገነን የነበረውን የመንግስት መዋቅር ከመቀየር አንስቶ ኢትዮጵያ በአካባቢው ከሚገኙ አገራት ጋር የነበራትን ግንኙነት በማሻሻላቸው ከፍተኛ አለም አቀፍ እውቅና ተችሯቸዋል፡፡ በዚህም ምክንያት ለዚህ አመት የኖቤል የሰላም ሽልማት ሁሉ ለመታጨት በቅተዋል፡፡ በአንጻሩ ደግሞ ከፍተኛ ሊባል የሚችል ህገ ወጥነት፣ በክልሎች ውስጥና በክልሎች መካከል የቀጠለ ግጭት፣ ማንነትን መሰረት ያደረጉ ጥቃቶችና ከፍተኛ የሃገር ውስጥ መፈናቀል ተከስቷል፡፡

በዚህም ምክንያት በመጀመሪያዎቹ የስልጣን ወራት ለጠ/ሚሩ የተቸረው እጅግ ከፍተኛ የህዝብ ድጋፍ በተለያዩ የሃገሪቱ ክፍሎች ባጋጠሙ ቀውሶች ምክንያት በቅርብ ጊዜያት ውስጥ መቀዛቀዝ ተስተውሎበታል፡፡ በተለያዩ የህብረተሰብ ክፍሎች ዘንድ፣ በአንዳንድ ተጻራሪ አመለካከት ባላቸው አካላት ጭምር፣ ከፍተኛ የለውጥ ፍላጎትን የቀሰቀሰው የጠቅላይ ሚኒስትሩ የስልጣን ጉዞ ከታሰበው በተቃራኒ መልካም አስተዳደርም ሆነ ሰላምን ሳያመጣ እንዳይከሽፍ ብዙዎች ይሰጋሉ፡፡ ቢያንስ ግን እስካሁን ባለው ነባራዊ ሁኔታ የጠቅላይ ሚኒስትሩ ስኬቶች ከችግሮቻቸው ልቀው ይታያሉ፣ ከባድ ፈተናዎቸ ከፊት ለፊት መኖራቸውን ሳይካድ፡፡

Read more on Chatham House website

Can Abiy Ahmed Continue to Remodel Ethiopia? Chatham House article

Ahmed Soliman and Abel Abate Demissie

The prime minister has made great strides at reforming the authoritarian state in his first year. But how will he confront the hurdles ahead?

It has been a whirlwind year for Ethiopia since Abiy Ahmed became prime minister. He has initiated a raft of reforms to overhaul Ethiopia’s authoritarian government structure, significantly improved relations with neighbours and received widespread international acclaim, including a nomination for the Nobel Peace Prize. But the same period has seen a sharp increase in lawlessness, intensified domestic conflict, heightened identity-based violence and huge internal displacement.

The fervour of ‘Abiymania’ has waned in recent months, as the reality of the monumental tests that lie ahead hit home. Having created massive expectations among competing constituencies, there are growing fears that Abiy’s reforms might end up achieving neither good governance nor stability. To date, his accomplishments far outweigh his shortcomings. But significant tests lie ahead.

Read more at Chatham House

Ethiopia and the AU: Special Responsibilities of a Host Nation

Mehari T. Maru and Abel Abate Demissie

 

This paper examines Ethiopia’s policy on the African Union (AU), and its predecessor—the OAU both as founding member and hosting nation. By defining what constitutes a grand strategy, as opposed to an ad hoc approach in pursuing national interest in a multilateral setting, the paper attempts to answer seven fundamental questions: (i) Has Ethiopia ever had a grand strategy regarding the OAU/AU, and if so, what are or were the main tenants of such a grand strategy or policy? (ii) Are there points of convergence and divergence in the policies of the three regimes of Emperor Haile Selassie, Colonel Mengistu Haile Mariam, the late Prime Minister Meles Zenawi and Prime Minister Haile Mariam Desalegn in respect of their policies toward the OAU/AU? (iii) Which of Ethiopia’s state institutions currently guide and formulate policies and decisions with regard to the AU and Pan African Community Organizations? (iv) How does Ethiopia’s approach to the AU differ from other key regional players such as Nigeria, South Africa, Egypt and Algeria? (vi) The Foreign Affairs and National Security Policy and Strategy (FANSPS) refers to the ‘special responsibilities of Ethiopia’ to the AU. What do ‘special responsibilities’ entail? (vii) Does Ethiopia have a hosting country policy? Is a there a need for a host nation policy? if there is such a need, what considerations should Ethiopia take into account in formulating a grand strategic toward the AU and a host nation policy? and (viii) by way of policy recommendations, what considerations should Ethiopia take into account in formulating a grand strategy and host nation policy? 

#Ethiopia #Africa_Union #IGAD #MFA #HostNation

 

Read the whole paper https://fes-ethiopia.org/1874

Ethiopia’s distinct path to development, with help from China

Ethiopia is the most stable state in the dangerous neighbourhood of the Horn of Africa, despite recently facing its worst protests in decades. The Ethiopian People’s Revolutionary Democratic Front (EPRDF) has been in power since 1991, having toppled the military Dergue regime (1974-1991). 

The country is touted as an economic and developmental success story. Growth rates have approached 10% annually for over a decade, compared to just 3% in the early 1990s. GDP was $54,8 billion in 2014, up from roughly $30 billion in 2010, although with almost 100 million people, per capita GDP languishes at $550 compared to the $1,700 average in sub-Saharan Africa. 

Ethiopia’s development narrative, at times simplistic and exaggerated (glorifying the ruling party), has nonetheless translated into tangible results. And China is a major chapter in this story. 

While large parts of Addis Ababa reveal a city under heavy construction and transformation, the most significant major improvements have occurred in rural areas, home to 80 million people, through government providing better agricultural inputs, building roads and investing in education and health. 

The poverty rate has dropped dramatically from 45.5% in 1995 to 29.6% in 2010. Ethiopia’s Human Development Index has improved by 45% over the past 15 years. In this same period, life expectancy at birth increased by 15.8 years, mean years of schooling rose by 0.7 years, expected years of schooling by 6.3, and gross national income per capita doubled.

Trade and investment

Trade and investment between China and Ethiopia has also mushroomed. Annual bilateral trade volumes multiplied thirteen-fold between 2003 and 2013. China has become not only Ethiopia’s biggest foreign investor but also its largest trading partner.  

Large-scale symbolic investment projects, like the African Union’s shiny new headquarters, dot Addis’s urban landscape. Its 100-metre high tower dominates the capital’s skyline. Costing $200 million, the building was entirely financed by Chinese grant money and implemented by the China State Construction Engineering Corporation, revealing Beijing’s ambition to strengthen its influence in Africa. 

Another symbol of development – Addis’s 32-kilometre light-rail system - was recently completed in just three years by China’s Eryuan Engineering Group.

Infrastructure

Chinese involvement in major Ethiopian infrastructure projects spans transport, energy and telecommunications. About 70% of the road network in Ethiopia – including the Ring Road around the capital, the Ethio-China Friendship Road and the Addis Ababa-Adama Expressway – has been built by Chinese companies.

The China Railway Engineering Corporation and China Civil Engineering Construction recently completed the 750km-long Ethiopia-Djibouti electrified railway line which cost $3,4 billion. Another huge contract, for the  major expansion of the Addis Ababa Bole International Airport, was awarded to the China Bridge and Road Corporation.

Energy

Energy is another key area of Chinese-Ethiopian collaboration, although most projects currently exist only on paper. The 300 MW Tekeze Dam, considered Africa’s highest concrete arch dam (or ‘the Three Gorges of Africa’), was completed in 2009 with the involvement of Sinohydro. 

Next to the partially completed Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam, Gibe III on the Omo River was inaugurated in 2015 and is expected to produce 1 870 MW. Dogged by major social and environmental concerns, the World Bank, African Development Bank and European Investment Bank withdrew from the project in 2010. 

That same year, the Ethiopian Electric Power Corporation and Dongfang Electric Machinery Corporation (a Chinese state-owned enterprise) signed a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) to provide electrical and mechanical equipment (turbines), while Italian building company Salini was awarded the actual dam construction contract. The Industrial and Commercial Bank of China is believed to cover 85% of the $495 million project. 

Additionally, China Eximbank is financially supporting high voltage transmission lines to Addis Ababa to be implemented by another Chinese company. Chinese operators will build power transmission lines for the Grand Renaissance Dam on the Blue Nile River.

Telecommunications

Zhongxin Telecommunication Equipment has helped upgrade and modernise Ethiopian telecommunications. By establishing a large mobile network in Addis and eight other cities, ZTE has boosted mobile telephony from one million to 15 million users between 2007 and 2012, despite criticism over the poor quality of the network and the installations. 

With new, more rigorous quality controls, the market has been opened to other operators, including France Telecom. Given its firm grip on the economy, the Ethiopian government shows exceptional ability to readjust to unbalanced and detrimental situations.

Politics

There are strong political ties between Ethiopia and China. The ruling Communist Party of China sent delegations to the Ethiopian People's Revolutionary Democratic Front  (EPRDF) organisational conferences (in 2008, 2010 and 2013) and signed an MoU on Exchange and Cooperation with the party. Close links exist between Ethiopia’s Parliament and China National People’s Congress.

Although Ethiopia, unlike China, enshrined multi-party democracy in its constitution, its growing authoritarianism and its heavy clampdowns on dissent also draw some parallels with China.

The Ethiopian government claims to have a “Developmental Democratic Model” unlike many Southeast Asian countries, including China. It says democratic rule must accompany rapid development to stave off national collapse. Yet democratic progress in Ethiopia has stagnated in the aftermath of the 2005 election crisis that left nearly 200 people dead. The future will tell if Ethiopia can transfer its developmental successes to the democratic realm.

Read the occasional paper on which this article is based here.

National Pride, Power and China’s Political Calculus in Ethiopia

Dr Romain Dittgen and Abel Abate Demissie

Contrary to the predominant perception of all of China’s key partners in Africa being either resource rich or economic powerhouses, Ethiopia is neither. Its strategic position within the Horn of Africa and its stable and efficient – although coercive – government, coupled with the concentration of regional institutions in Addis Ababa, have gradually turned Ethiopia into one of the main entry points into Africa. While pursuing its own development path, the Ethiopian government has also been drawing inspiration from success stories in East Asia, not least China.

In terms of engaging with foreign partners, Ethiopia is increasingly skilled in linking its national development priorities to its foreign policy strategies. As a result, the ruling party’s firm grip on the economy and on political power is having a direct impact on its engagement with foreign actors. By focusing on the themes of peace and security, human security and governance capacity building, this paper not only explores the nature of political cultures and concepts of power in Ethiopia but also looks at the ways in which China navigates this complex political landscape (both domestically and regionally) while seeking to expand its foothold and bargaining power on the ground.

Bilateral relations between Ethiopia and China have improved significantly over the past two decades. Between 2003 and 2013 the yearly volume of bilateral trade has multiplied by more than 13 and China has become not only Ethiopia’s biggest foreign investor but also its largest trading partner. As part of its expanding role and tangible presence in the country, the Chinese government has constructed large-scale projects in Ethiopia, including the Express Toll Way, the first operative wind power plant, the Addis Ababa Light Track Railway, the Ethiopia–Djibouti railway line, the Tirunesh-Beijing Hospital and a Confucius Institute. This level of co-operation has also been strengthened by the relative proximity in political ideology between the EPRDF and the CPC.

Both Chinese and Ethiopian officials proudly refer to the longevity of their own history (5 000 and more than 2 000 years respectively), and speak about the importance and ownership of their state-led developmental path. Since Xi’s coming to power in 2013, domestic politics in China have been dominated by the ‘Four Comprehensives’ political guidelines. Less vague than the ‘Chinese dream’ concept, the aims of the ‘Four Comprehensives’ are for China to ‘(re)build a modern and prosperous society in all respects by 2020’, ‘strengthen the rule of law and improve the party’s conduct’, ‘enforce party discipline’ and ‘strengthen reforms’, with the last three being seen as strategic steps. Despite strong party-to-party links between the two countries, it is difficult to assess whether and how much these domestic Chinese guidelines are spilling over into the Ethiopian context.

As outlined in the course of this paper, Chinese influence in the fields of governance and politics in Ethiopia appears to be quite constrained, due to the nature of Ethiopian statecraft and the strong vertical as well as horizontal dimensions of power and control practised by the ruling party. Nonetheless, the EPRDF’s developmental rhetoric of enforcing strong limitations on personalised rent-seeking, clamping down on corruption and accelerating economic reforms, resonates strongly with the ‘Four Comprehensives’ envisaged by the Chinese leadership. This said, China’s power of persuasion is mostly limited to being perceived as an example of economic success, while, politically speaking, Ethiopia is much more drawn to emulate experiences from South Korea and Japan.

For Western partners, the importance is to assess when this eventual turning point – the evolution from a purely developmental approach to a broadening of the political discourse – might happen. Until then, maintaining a stable and effective government seems to form the basis of a tacit agreement between Western and Chinese stakeholders.

If complementaries between the broader ‘West’ and China in Ethiopia seem limited to contributing to development priorities, the importance of the regional focus provides numerous avenues for dialogue and collaboration. The most obvious one comes in the form of China’s intensified interest in engaging the AU alongside other Western powers. In the field of peace and security, where China is also becoming more active, it is fairly easy to provide practical inputs as the framework is already entrenched.

The African Peace and Security Architecture, which offers a complete overview – from prevention and management to post-conflict reconstruction and development – allows development partners to engage in specific areas. However, while the AU holds ownership at the strategic level, most financial support is still coming from the outside. According to the director of a research institute in Addis Ababa, ‘donors have a lot to say and are able to influence the decision-making process’.

As a newcomer in this position, China is willing to be guided and learn from its more established counterparts. At present, Beijing is more comfortable in supporting peacekeeping missions than getting too involved in conflict prevention and mediation. Yet Beijing’s reaction to recent terrorist attacks (also directly affecting Chinese citizens), as well as the confirmation that a logistics hub for military operations will be set up in Djibouti, not only signals a broader, more active role for China but also provides possibilities to collaborate with Western countries, both at AU level and throughout the Horn of Africa.

Continue reading the full paper, entitled “Paper Own Ways of Doing: National Pride, Power and China’s Political Calculus in Ethiopia”, on South African Journal of International Affairs.