By
Mehari Taddele Maru and Abel Abate
Two
weeks after the June 10 agreement was signed to form a transitional government
of national unity within 60 days, on 23 June 2014, the Intergovernmental
Authority on Development (IGAD)-led peace talks on South Sudan have adjourned
the multi-stakeholders’ consultations.
It
is to be recalled that the South Sudanese government threatened to withdraw
from the IGAD mediation after the Executive Secretary of the IGAD, Eng. Mahboub
Maalim, allegedly said that the warring parties were “stupid” if they thought
they could win militarily. Both the government and the rebel group complained
about the Executive Secretary’s remarks. South Sudan’s Information
Minister told Iranian Press TV that his government was capable of continuing
the peace talks without IGAD in any other forum where the parties would be
‘dignified’ and ‘respected’. The minister also added that his government has
written a letter of complaint to the Chairman of IGAD and the Ethiopian Prime
Minister, demanding that action be taken against the Executive Secretary of
IGAD. Despite the undiplomatic wording of the recent statement by the IGAD Executive
Secretary, his statement was merely a restatement of the position shared by
IGAD and the AU, that the crisis in South Sudan is political and cannot be
solved militarily, thus only through a peaceful process.
At
the centre of all the posturing, the delays and political manoeuvring are wrong
assumptions and expectations of the warring parties about the IGAD- led
mediation. With an increasingly diminishing legitimacy and popular basis, the
warring parties and, most importantly, the government exhibits lack of
commitment and concern for the people of South Sudan and their suffering.
Believing
that IGAD and the other regional governance institutions, particularly the AU,
would support their position, the warring factions of the SPLM/A supported the
IGAD-led mediation effort without any reservations. By designating the crisis
as a failed coup, President Salva Kirr may have assumed that the AU, and
therefore IGAD, would corroborate and condemn the SPLM/A In-Opposition as the
perpetrator of an attempted unconstitutional change of government proscribed
under the AU Convention, particularly the Charter on Democracy, Elections and
Good Governance. For Dr Riek Machar, the gravity of the crisis and the severe
victimization of the Nuer community, as well as the determination of that
community to support his bid to remove President Kiir from power, has
emboldened his belief that the mediation process will favour him.
Another
very important factor in attempts to pursue mediation under IGAD may be the
fact that IGAD does not have both a carrot and a stick. This is factually true,
but analytically incorrect. Despite IGAD’s limited power to sanction and
ensure observance, IGAD’s partners, including the USA and the EU, who rallied
behind the mediation efforts on South Sudan, have many carrots and many big
sticks to ensure observance.
Understanding
the sheer disregard of their responsibility on the side of the warring parties,
IGAD’s framework evidently displayed the required inclusivity, thus avoiding a
blanket endorsement of their self- aggrandizing positions. The IGAD-led
mediation avoided an over-reliance on the warring parties and called for
multi-stakeholders to pursue consultations that reach out to the South Sudanese
community beyond the warring parties.
Given
that the SPLM has lost the popular legitimacy it enjoyed during the armed
struggle for independence, now no institutional body or organs can effectively
claim legitimacy to govern South Sudan. Requiring an inclusive approach for the
dialogue and transitional process, the IGAD-led mediation process has granted
all the power to the stakeholders to decide the procedure and substance of the
dialogue and the transitional process.
As
leaders of factions of the SPLM, with high vulnerability from both external and
internal actors, both President Kiir and Dr Machar face resistance to taking
more moderate positions. Both President Kiir and Dr Machar are now succumbing
to the pressures of their respective constituents, the SPLM/A and government
officials and large members of the Nuer community respectively. Fearing the
return of the former detained ministers and SPLM/A leaders to their posts,
President Kiir is increasingly facing strong opposition from those who have
been appointed to these vacant positions. A serious problem of President Kiir
resides in his inability to stand on his own two feet and his dependence on
Ugandan ‘presidential’ military support as well as his inability to rein in his
colleagues in Juba. The claim that he signed the Agreement under duress emanates
from this critical weakness. Pleading with the President of Uganda to withdraw
his troops from South Sudan on the one hand, and declaring on the other hand
that his government could not survive long without the Ugandan army, exhibits
the sad state of affairs of the SPLM/A. With multiple divergent voices and
contradictory positions in Addis Ababa, Juba and Kampala, the incumbent group
has been searching for any pretext to avoid its accountability to the IGAD-led
mediation efforts.
In
contrast, Dr Machar will have face serious challenge internally if he was to
join a national unity government where Mr Kiir remains president. While the
former detainees do not consider him as their leader, influential Nuer
politicians would not allow him to work directly with Mr Kiir as president.
Indeed, for him personally, he may seek the presidency after the end of the
transitional process and has a slim chance of winning. .
Indicative
of the disappointment of the regional, Pan-African and International
communities about the lack of concern for the suffering population and the
absence of any commitment to resolve the crisis, “the IGAD-led mediation
[urged] the political leaders of South Sudan to assume their responsibilities
with the same resolve that their neighbours and the international community
attach to this tragic situation.” IGAD’s special envoys including Ethiopia’s
former long serving Foreign Minister Seyoum Mesfin who knows the region, and
the international partners well have galvanized a seamless alliance around the
framework. While focusing on the need to move to “the full operationalization
of the Monitoring and Verification Mechanism (MVM) in accordance with UNSC
Resolution 2155”, IGAD with strong backing from the international community
intends to deploy the “Regional Protection Force with “a new mandate to protect
civilians, reinforce the MVM and ensure unhindered humanitarian access as well
as the protection of humanitarian corridors.” Failing to abide by the IGAD-led
mediation will certainly lead to strong international unanimous
condemnation.
According
to reports, US Secretary of State John Kerry has even tried to persuade three
of South Sudan’s immediate neighbours to impose tough penalties against
spoilers of the mediation process. The warring parties, particularly the
incumbent group with a huge responsibility of governing a population, would
face serious difficulty if sanctions were to be imposed.
Lacking
the type of party and state structure and popular anti-western social base that
enabled the Sudanese and Eritrean regime to survive and sustain themselves
under similar sanctions and international pressure, the SPLM/A and the state
would be unable to sustain similar levels of sanctions if they were to be
imposed. Solely dependent on oil revenue for financing the entire public
service, the state faces a serious decline in its ability to exercise
legitimate core functions, including the maintenance of law and order and the
operation of the armed forces (SPLA). This weakness could constitute a recipe
for state failure in South Sudan.
The
mediation process is taking place in unfavorable circumstances, requiring the
adoption of some imperfect positions and approaches, such as the inclusion of
ethnic and religious representatives with the vision and commitment to
transform themselves and their followers from a purely sectarian outlook to
that of democratic citizenry. In this regard, a serious concern of the IGAD-led
mediation process is the need to ensure the inclusivity of all representatives
of all communities, particularly those from peripheral areas located far away
from Juba. These include organizations that were disenfranchised even before
the crisis erupted (mainly in the diaspora) and those who were displaced during
and after the crisis, such as the South Sudan Human Rights Society for Advocacy
(SSHURSA). Only if the dialogue is reflective of the hopes and fears of all
segments of South Sudanese society, is it possible for the national
constitutive dialogue in South Sudan to enjoy a popular legitimacy, thereby
serving as a constituent assembly with a view to creating a prosperous,
peaceful and constitutional democratic state.
Ed.'s
Note: Mehari Taddele Maru holds a
Doctorate of Legal Sciences (DSL), is an international consultant on African
Union affairs and a scholar in international law. Abel Abate Demissie is a
senior researcher at the Ethiopian International Institute for Peace and
Development (EIIPD). He can be reached at abel.eiipd@gmail.com
