Unrest Threatens Ethiopia’s Transition Under Abiy Ahmed

Ethiopia is experiencing a turbulent transition. The uncompromising approach of political forces threatens to tear the country apart and reverse the hard-won gains made in recent years. 

Violent unrest in Addis Ababa and the surrounding Oromia region has led to the loss of over 177 lives, with the detention of thousands and widespread destruction to property. The rise of identity-based conflict and related political tension is the most severe test of Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed’s leadership since he came to power two years ago.

Protests erupted after the assassination on the 29th of June of Hachalu Hundessa, a prominent Oromo singer and activist. They spiralled into widespread rioting, looting and arson which devastated some towns. Targeted attacks and killings, particularly against ethnic minorities in Oromia, have damaged communities’ social fabric and heightened regional tensions.

The motives behind Hachalu’s murder are not fully understood. Suspects linked to a militant faction of the Oromo Liberation Front (OLF) have been arrested, while the government has blamed the Tigray People’s Liberation Front (TPLF) and certain prominent activist-politicians for inciting ethnic violence and attempting to derail Ethiopia’s fragile political liberalization. With investigations not yet concluded, any exploitation of this tragedy for political gain and without adequate due process is likely to further erode trust in the government and public institutions. 

Ethiopia’s progress halting under Abiy Ahmed

The prime minister came to power with a vision of national unity – encapsulated in his ideology of Medemer – and implemented a raft of reforms aimed at strengthening institutions and increasing political space, inclusivity and freedoms. Abiy was awarded the 2019 Nobel Peace Prize for Ethiopia’s rapprochement with Eritrea, alongside domestic progress. He was lauded for mediating within the region, including in Sudan following the ouster of Omar al-Bashir.

However, Ethiopia’s simmering ethnic and political divisions have deep roots, with structural problems that have been insufficiently addressed under Abiy’s helm. These include conflicting narratives about Ethiopia’s history, an unfinished federal project and tensions over the division of power between the centre and the regions.

There is also the desire for better representation from various ethnic groups, linked to the pursuit of greater autonomy in many places, notably in the ethnically diverse southern region. Reforms have increased expectations among competing constituencies, heightening tensions further.

There are signs that Ethiopia is sliding dangerously backwards, particularly on security and democracy. The country has seen worsening levels of militant ethno-nationalism and inter-communal violence, a dangerous standoff between the federal government and Tigray region, and an increase in politically motivated deaths.

This has been compounded by the government turning to familiar, heavy-handed and securitized responses to law and order challenges, including intimidation and mass arrests of civilians, opposition politicians and journalists, and shutting off the internet. The Ethiopian Human Rights Commission called for security forces to refrain from punitive measures and pursue conciliatory approaches in implementing the state of emergency measures brought in to deal with COVID-19.

The country is also facing a triple economic shock caused by the pandemic, renewed instability and devastating desert locust swarms. The IMF recently reduced Ethiopia’s GDP growth projections for 2019/2020 to 3.2 percent down from 6.2 percent and the country has estimated that 1.4 million workers will be affected by the pandemic, particularly in the service and manufacturing sectors.

The impact on agriculture, which accounts for a third of GDP and on which most Ethiopian’s depend for their livelihoods, is expected to be severe. In addition to shaking investor confidence, the likely impact on livelihoods, food security and poverty levels makes it harder for the government to maintain public support and could add to instability.

Political turmoil caused by election delay

The situation has been exacerbated by the indefinite postponement of elections that were due in August 2020, as a result of COVID-19.

Efforts to avoid a crisis of legitimacy for the government caused by the end of parliament’s term in October 2020, led to a decision on the way forward being taken by the Council of Constitutional Inquiry (CCI). This group of legal experts led by the President of the Supreme Court, gave the ruling Prosperity Party (PP) an open-ended extension of their term, rubberstamped by the House of Federation, with no limits set on their powers during the interim period.

This decision sets a dangerous precedent and is a missed opportunity to achieve compromise and advance the democratic process. The lack of inclusion has angered opposition groups, with whom the government has had little genuine dialogue. Many in the opposition had advocated for a transitional or technocratic government during the interim, despite risks of further divisions and a vacuum of authority, and accuse the PP of manipulating institutions to stay in power.

Furthermore, the TPLF, the ruling party in the Tigray region and formerly the dominant national political force, is pushing forward with its intention to hold unilateral regional elections. It formed a new regional electoral commission, in spite of objections from the national electoral board and the government, which has implied it could use force to stop the elections. This rising enmity between the PP and the TPLF is extremely worrying and requires immediate de-escalation.

A pathway to genuine dialogue and reconciliation

Ethiopia’s problems can only be resolved through dialogue, compromise and reconciliation. Escalating tensions, particularly between the federal government, Tigray and Oromo opposition groups risk furthering instability and fragmentation. One way to establish confidence would be for a group of respected Ethiopian personalities (elders and religious leaders) to lead a political dialogue, with actors carefully chosen and vetted to ensure the buy-in of government, opposition parties and the public, and supported by Ethiopia’s regional and international partners.

Once established, an initial goal of such a platform would be to induce elites, populist leaders, activists and influential regional media to stop exploiting division and violence for narrow gain. Priority agenda issues include the election timetable and required institutional and legal reforms, the role of the opposition during the interim period, strengthening reconciliation efforts, and the need to carefully manage autonomous security forces within regional states.

The prime minister can still weather the storm and implement his vision of a unified multinational Ethiopia based on the values of democracy, rule of law and justice, but only if the government and other stakeholders do all they can to reduce tensions and preserve peace at this critical juncture. COVID-19 and the associated economic impacts have deepened the country’s multifaceted problems, which can only be resolved by political actors committing themselves towards inclusive dialogue and reconciliation, as they seek to forge a shared common future.

Op-Ed: Beyond the constitutional debate: unpacking the political conundrum

The Ethiopian constitution drove more interest, analysis and scrutiny in the past month than it had since its promulgation. Politicians and scholars have discussed and debated on what they referred as a constitutional conundrum after the National election board announced that it cannot conduct election as scheduled due to the COVID-19 pandemic.

Lack of clear provisions in the constitution to determine what happens if elections cannot be held for reasons such as a global pandemic is at the center of the conundrum. What is the legitimate constitutional way to extend the elections? Who will have the legitimate power to rule until the election is held? How long can the election get extended? Can regions decide to have their own elections?

Some have argued that these questions are fundamentally constitutional ones and must be resolved by constitutional mechanisms only. To the contrary some others have argued that this is primarily a political problem and solutions must be sought politically.

Constitutions are political documents and are supposed to devise systems and institutions to address issues, including political ones such as this one. When constitutions resolve political problems, it is rightfully called the rule of law which is a means and an end in any constitutional democratic system.  

However, Ethiopia’s current context requires a closer look at political issues, motives and positions that underpin the constitutional conundrum if it is to have any chance of success in sustaining the political order.  Many have written on the political issues and proposed solutions. At the risk of being redundant, or even stating the obvious, this article is an attempt to examine the political conundrum and analyze the possibility of success of the constitutional process. 

further read: https://addisstandard.com/op-ed-beyond-the-constitutional-debate-unpacking-the-political-conundrum/

Commentary: Can Abiy Ahmed Continue to Remodel Ethiopia? (expanded version) Addis Standard

Abel Abate Demissie & Ahmed Soliman

The prime minister has made great strides at reforming the authoritarian state in his first year. But how will he confront the hurdles ahead?

Addis Abeba, April 17/2019 – It has been a whirlwind year for Ethiopia since Abiy Ahmed became prime minister. He has initiated a raft of reforms to overhaul Ethiopia’s authoritarian government structure, significantly improved relations with neighbors and received widespread international acclaim, including a nomination for the Nobel Peace Prize. But the same period has seen a sharp increase in lawlessness, intensified domestic conflict, heightened identity-based violence and huge internal displacement.

The fervor of ‘Abiymania’ has waned in recent months, as the reality of the monumental tests that lie ahead hit home. Having created massive expectations among competing constituencies, there are growing fears that Abiy’s reforms might end up achieving neither good governance nor stability. To date his accomplishments far outweigh his shortcomings. But significant tests lie ahead.
For his government’s undoubted successes to be built on, the prime minister needs to re-double focus on the domestic agenda. This includes dealing with the growing unrest, revitalizing the ruling party under a common vision and detailing a strategy for institutionalizing political, judicial, security, economic and social reforms. This restructure will require well targeted and sequenced plans, along with his unifying philosophy of Medemer, especially given continued institutional capacity constraints.

Read more on Addis Standard

ጠ/ሚ አብይ አህመድ ኢትዮጵያን በለውጥ ሃዲድ ያስቀጥሉ ይሆን? Chatham House article

Abel Abate and Ahmed Soliman

ከጠቅላይ ሚኒስትር አብይ ወደ ስልጣን መምጣት ወዲህ ኢትዮጵያ በፈጣን የለውጥ ጎዳና ላይ ትገኛለች፡፡ ጠቅላይ ሚኒስትሩ መጠነ ሰፊ የማሻሻያ እርምጃዎችን በመውሰድ አምባገነን የነበረውን የመንግስት መዋቅር ከመቀየር አንስቶ ኢትዮጵያ በአካባቢው ከሚገኙ አገራት ጋር የነበራትን ግንኙነት በማሻሻላቸው ከፍተኛ አለም አቀፍ እውቅና ተችሯቸዋል፡፡ በዚህም ምክንያት ለዚህ አመት የኖቤል የሰላም ሽልማት ሁሉ ለመታጨት በቅተዋል፡፡ በአንጻሩ ደግሞ ከፍተኛ ሊባል የሚችል ህገ ወጥነት፣ በክልሎች ውስጥና በክልሎች መካከል የቀጠለ ግጭት፣ ማንነትን መሰረት ያደረጉ ጥቃቶችና ከፍተኛ የሃገር ውስጥ መፈናቀል ተከስቷል፡፡

በዚህም ምክንያት በመጀመሪያዎቹ የስልጣን ወራት ለጠ/ሚሩ የተቸረው እጅግ ከፍተኛ የህዝብ ድጋፍ በተለያዩ የሃገሪቱ ክፍሎች ባጋጠሙ ቀውሶች ምክንያት በቅርብ ጊዜያት ውስጥ መቀዛቀዝ ተስተውሎበታል፡፡ በተለያዩ የህብረተሰብ ክፍሎች ዘንድ፣ በአንዳንድ ተጻራሪ አመለካከት ባላቸው አካላት ጭምር፣ ከፍተኛ የለውጥ ፍላጎትን የቀሰቀሰው የጠቅላይ ሚኒስትሩ የስልጣን ጉዞ ከታሰበው በተቃራኒ መልካም አስተዳደርም ሆነ ሰላምን ሳያመጣ እንዳይከሽፍ ብዙዎች ይሰጋሉ፡፡ ቢያንስ ግን እስካሁን ባለው ነባራዊ ሁኔታ የጠቅላይ ሚኒስትሩ ስኬቶች ከችግሮቻቸው ልቀው ይታያሉ፣ ከባድ ፈተናዎቸ ከፊት ለፊት መኖራቸውን ሳይካድ፡፡

Read more on Chatham House website

Can Abiy Ahmed Continue to Remodel Ethiopia? Chatham House article

Ahmed Soliman and Abel Abate Demissie

The prime minister has made great strides at reforming the authoritarian state in his first year. But how will he confront the hurdles ahead?

It has been a whirlwind year for Ethiopia since Abiy Ahmed became prime minister. He has initiated a raft of reforms to overhaul Ethiopia’s authoritarian government structure, significantly improved relations with neighbours and received widespread international acclaim, including a nomination for the Nobel Peace Prize. But the same period has seen a sharp increase in lawlessness, intensified domestic conflict, heightened identity-based violence and huge internal displacement.

The fervour of ‘Abiymania’ has waned in recent months, as the reality of the monumental tests that lie ahead hit home. Having created massive expectations among competing constituencies, there are growing fears that Abiy’s reforms might end up achieving neither good governance nor stability. To date, his accomplishments far outweigh his shortcomings. But significant tests lie ahead.

Read more at Chatham House

Ethiopia and the AU: Special Responsibilities of a Host Nation

Mehari T. Maru and Abel Abate Demissie

 

This paper examines Ethiopia’s policy on the African Union (AU), and its predecessor—the OAU both as founding member and hosting nation. By defining what constitutes a grand strategy, as opposed to an ad hoc approach in pursuing national interest in a multilateral setting, the paper attempts to answer seven fundamental questions: (i) Has Ethiopia ever had a grand strategy regarding the OAU/AU, and if so, what are or were the main tenants of such a grand strategy or policy? (ii) Are there points of convergence and divergence in the policies of the three regimes of Emperor Haile Selassie, Colonel Mengistu Haile Mariam, the late Prime Minister Meles Zenawi and Prime Minister Haile Mariam Desalegn in respect of their policies toward the OAU/AU? (iii) Which of Ethiopia’s state institutions currently guide and formulate policies and decisions with regard to the AU and Pan African Community Organizations? (iv) How does Ethiopia’s approach to the AU differ from other key regional players such as Nigeria, South Africa, Egypt and Algeria? (vi) The Foreign Affairs and National Security Policy and Strategy (FANSPS) refers to the ‘special responsibilities of Ethiopia’ to the AU. What do ‘special responsibilities’ entail? (vii) Does Ethiopia have a hosting country policy? Is a there a need for a host nation policy? if there is such a need, what considerations should Ethiopia take into account in formulating a grand strategic toward the AU and a host nation policy? and (viii) by way of policy recommendations, what considerations should Ethiopia take into account in formulating a grand strategy and host nation policy? 

#Ethiopia #Africa_Union #IGAD #MFA #HostNation

 

Read the whole paper https://fes-ethiopia.org/1874

Ethiopia’s distinct path to development, with help from China

Ethiopia is the most stable state in the dangerous neighbourhood of the Horn of Africa, despite recently facing its worst protests in decades. The Ethiopian People’s Revolutionary Democratic Front (EPRDF) has been in power since 1991, having toppled the military Dergue regime (1974-1991). 

The country is touted as an economic and developmental success story. Growth rates have approached 10% annually for over a decade, compared to just 3% in the early 1990s. GDP was $54,8 billion in 2014, up from roughly $30 billion in 2010, although with almost 100 million people, per capita GDP languishes at $550 compared to the $1,700 average in sub-Saharan Africa. 

Ethiopia’s development narrative, at times simplistic and exaggerated (glorifying the ruling party), has nonetheless translated into tangible results. And China is a major chapter in this story. 

While large parts of Addis Ababa reveal a city under heavy construction and transformation, the most significant major improvements have occurred in rural areas, home to 80 million people, through government providing better agricultural inputs, building roads and investing in education and health. 

The poverty rate has dropped dramatically from 45.5% in 1995 to 29.6% in 2010. Ethiopia’s Human Development Index has improved by 45% over the past 15 years. In this same period, life expectancy at birth increased by 15.8 years, mean years of schooling rose by 0.7 years, expected years of schooling by 6.3, and gross national income per capita doubled.

Trade and investment

Trade and investment between China and Ethiopia has also mushroomed. Annual bilateral trade volumes multiplied thirteen-fold between 2003 and 2013. China has become not only Ethiopia’s biggest foreign investor but also its largest trading partner.  

Large-scale symbolic investment projects, like the African Union’s shiny new headquarters, dot Addis’s urban landscape. Its 100-metre high tower dominates the capital’s skyline. Costing $200 million, the building was entirely financed by Chinese grant money and implemented by the China State Construction Engineering Corporation, revealing Beijing’s ambition to strengthen its influence in Africa. 

Another symbol of development – Addis’s 32-kilometre light-rail system - was recently completed in just three years by China’s Eryuan Engineering Group.

Infrastructure

Chinese involvement in major Ethiopian infrastructure projects spans transport, energy and telecommunications. About 70% of the road network in Ethiopia – including the Ring Road around the capital, the Ethio-China Friendship Road and the Addis Ababa-Adama Expressway – has been built by Chinese companies.

The China Railway Engineering Corporation and China Civil Engineering Construction recently completed the 750km-long Ethiopia-Djibouti electrified railway line which cost $3,4 billion. Another huge contract, for the  major expansion of the Addis Ababa Bole International Airport, was awarded to the China Bridge and Road Corporation.

Energy

Energy is another key area of Chinese-Ethiopian collaboration, although most projects currently exist only on paper. The 300 MW Tekeze Dam, considered Africa’s highest concrete arch dam (or ‘the Three Gorges of Africa’), was completed in 2009 with the involvement of Sinohydro. 

Next to the partially completed Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam, Gibe III on the Omo River was inaugurated in 2015 and is expected to produce 1 870 MW. Dogged by major social and environmental concerns, the World Bank, African Development Bank and European Investment Bank withdrew from the project in 2010. 

That same year, the Ethiopian Electric Power Corporation and Dongfang Electric Machinery Corporation (a Chinese state-owned enterprise) signed a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) to provide electrical and mechanical equipment (turbines), while Italian building company Salini was awarded the actual dam construction contract. The Industrial and Commercial Bank of China is believed to cover 85% of the $495 million project. 

Additionally, China Eximbank is financially supporting high voltage transmission lines to Addis Ababa to be implemented by another Chinese company. Chinese operators will build power transmission lines for the Grand Renaissance Dam on the Blue Nile River.

Telecommunications

Zhongxin Telecommunication Equipment has helped upgrade and modernise Ethiopian telecommunications. By establishing a large mobile network in Addis and eight other cities, ZTE has boosted mobile telephony from one million to 15 million users between 2007 and 2012, despite criticism over the poor quality of the network and the installations. 

With new, more rigorous quality controls, the market has been opened to other operators, including France Telecom. Given its firm grip on the economy, the Ethiopian government shows exceptional ability to readjust to unbalanced and detrimental situations.

Politics

There are strong political ties between Ethiopia and China. The ruling Communist Party of China sent delegations to the Ethiopian People's Revolutionary Democratic Front  (EPRDF) organisational conferences (in 2008, 2010 and 2013) and signed an MoU on Exchange and Cooperation with the party. Close links exist between Ethiopia’s Parliament and China National People’s Congress.

Although Ethiopia, unlike China, enshrined multi-party democracy in its constitution, its growing authoritarianism and its heavy clampdowns on dissent also draw some parallels with China.

The Ethiopian government claims to have a “Developmental Democratic Model” unlike many Southeast Asian countries, including China. It says democratic rule must accompany rapid development to stave off national collapse. Yet democratic progress in Ethiopia has stagnated in the aftermath of the 2005 election crisis that left nearly 200 people dead. The future will tell if Ethiopia can transfer its developmental successes to the democratic realm.

Read the occasional paper on which this article is based here.